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It’s Raining Katz and Jones: The
Implications of United States v. Jones–A
Case of Sound and Fury
Jace C. Gatewood
I.

Introduction

Reading the highly anticipated decision of United States v. Jones,1
concerning the constitutionality of the installation and use by police of a
GPS tracking device without a warrant, was much like waking up
Christmas morning only to find out that you did not get everything on
your Christmas list. Santa not only did not bring you everything on your
list, but also forgot all the good stuff. So, all of the excitement and
anticipation of the moment yields way to “Bah! Humbug!” 2 feelings, and
the long awaited moment becomes merely a footnote in annals of
Christmases past. Such may be the case with Jones and its lasting impact
and significance. Like the decision itself, the long-term impact of Jones
on Fourth Amendment 3 jurisprudence and privacy concerns in the wake
of GPS surveillance and similar tracking technologies is likely to be
much like the tale of the idiot—“full of sound and fury, [s]ignifying
nothing.”4
The Jones case garnered widespread coverage across the nation, 5
and became a polarizing topic of discussion especially among lawyers,
judges, legal commentators, and law students. Even the average person
on the street seemed to have an opinion regarding the authority of the
 Associate Professor of Law, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School. I would like to
express my deepest gratitude to my research assistant, Kandice Allen, whose thorough
research and tireless dedication were invaluable to the completion of this article.
1. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2. “Bah! Humbug!” is the catchphrase used by Ebenezer Scrooge, the principal
character in Charles Dickens's novel A Christmas Carol. CHARLES DICKENS, A
CHRISTMAS CAROL 3 (Cricket House Books 2009) (1843).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
5. Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers and Three Questions after United States v.
Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment “GPS Case” 1 (March 28, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2030390.
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government to secretly track the public movements of a person in
everyday life. 6 Many hoped that the opinion would finally put to rest the
long debated issue regarding whether the warrantless installation and use
of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement to track the movements of
suspects along public roads constitutes a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.7 But even more, many others hoped that the Court
would ultimately provide some guidance on the degree of permissible
intrusion that would be acceptable in the wake of electronic surveillance
and other tracking technologies utilized by law enforcement in this
digitally interconnected age. 8 While the opinion specifically answered
the question, “whether under the facts in Jones, the government’s actions
violated the Fourth Amendment,” 9 the opinion fell far short of providing
guidance about the Fourth Amendment implications of the use of GPS
tracking devices and other technologically advanced tracking methods.
The opinion also failed to address any Fourth Amendment privacy
concerns in the wake of such technologically advanced devices and their
general use by law enforcement as investigatory tools. 10
In this digital age, spyware, smartphones, security cameras, licenseplate scanners, home security systems, body scanners, and other such
technologically advanced devices are becoming common-place and are
functionally capable of the same degree of intrusion as GPS devices. The
Court’s reliance on common law trespass to resolve the ultimate issue in
Jones leaves uncertain the constitutionality of many investigatory
techniques that make the need for any trespassory intrusion superfluous.
Additionally, when you consider third-party services, such as Facebook,
Twitter, OnStar and other similar services, where large amounts of data

6. See Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones: Does Katz Still Have
Nine Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 116, 117 (2012).
7. See, e.g., id. (“Many thought that, with the United States Supreme Court’s
anticipated decision in United States v. Jones, we would no longer harbor any uncertainty
as to when Big Brother was born.”).
8. See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, The Drug Dealer, The Narc, and the Very Tiny
Constable: Reflections on United States v. Jones, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 113, 114 (2012)
(“My . . . critique is leveled at the Court’s refusal to answer the . . . question . . . whether
the police actions in Jones constituted a search, given contemporary realities regarding
technology and social norms, regardless of whether a common law trespass was
committed.”).
9. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
10. See Barry Friedman, Privacy, Technology and Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2012,
at SR5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/opinion/sunday/in-the-gpscase-issues-of-privacy-and-technology.html.
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about an individual can be collected and stored, 11 and the possibility that
police may have access to this information without any trespassory
intrusion, the decision in Jones appears largely illusionary. For these
reasons, and because the Court avoided most of the complex Fourth
Amendment issues implicated by use of technologically advanced
tracking devices, the narrow focus of Jones12 may likely render its
usefulness going forward mostly insignificant; merely a footnote in the
annals of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Article discusses the implications of Jones in light of emerging
technology capable of duplicating the monitoring undertaken in Jones
with the same degree of intrusiveness attributable to GPS tracking
devices, but without depending on any physical invasion of property.
This Article also discusses how the pervasive use of this emerging
technology may reshape reasonable expectations of privacy concerning
an individual’s public movements, making it all the more difficult to
apply the Fourth Amendment constitutional tests outlined in Jones. In
this regard, this Article explores recent trends in electronic tracking,
surveillance, and other investigative methods that have raised privacy
concerns, including automatic license-plate recognition systems,
smartphone tracking, and third-party subpoenas to access private
information from third-party service providers. All of these methods may
fall outside the purview of the current constitutional constructs identified
in Jones, even though the accumulated effect of the information collected
can provide a comprehensive record of an individual’s comings and
goings. This Article makes the argument that neither Jones nor the
reasonable expectation of privacy test set forth in Katz v. United States 13
provides adequate Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless
unwanted electronic intrusions by law enforcement or other
nontrespassory invasions, even though such intrusion may result in the
collection of vast amounts of information about an individual’s daily

11. See Joseph Menn, Online Privacy Fears Stoked by Google, Twitter, Facebook
Data Collection Arms Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2012, 9:06 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/19/online-privacy-google-twitter-facebook-datacollection_n_1287419.html.
12. See Adam Liptak, Justices Reject GPS Tracking in a Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/us/police-use-ofgps-is-ruled-unconstitutional.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“Justice Sotomayor joined the
majority opinion, agreeing that many questions could be left for another day ‘because the
government’s physical intrusion on Jones’s Jeep supplies a narrower basis for
decision.’”).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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movements, either because there is no physical trespass involved,
because of the nature of the intrusion, or because of the pervasiveness of
the technology involved.
II.

Implications of Jones

To begin, Jones did not appear too terribly complex, and with its
unanimous decision, one would think that this was, in fact, the case.
However, while the Justices were unanimous in their decision, the
underlying reasoning beneath the Court’s holding was split five-four,
with three Justices penning separate opinions, all espousing separate
reasoning and, at times, criticizing the others’ rationale. To better
appreciate all of the “sound and fury” 14 of the Justices in their seemingly
warring opinions, it is necessary to go back to the beginning.
A.

Brief Background of Jones

In 2004, Antoine Jones, the owner of a nightclub in the District of
Columbia, was under investigation for suspicion of drug trafficking. 15
During the course of the investigation, officers utilized various
investigative methods, including visual surveillance, a pen register, and
wiretaps.16 In 2005, based on the information gathered from their
investigation, the government applied for a warrant to install a GPS
tracking device on a vehicle driven by Jones, which was registered in his
wife’s name. 17 The warrant authorized the agents to install the GPS
tracking device in the District of Columbia within ten days. 18
Agents installed the GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of
Jones’s vehicle on the eleventh day while the vehicle was parked in a
public parking lot located in Maryland, not while the vehicle was in the
District of Columbia.19 Over a twenty-eight day period, the government
used the GPS tracking device to record the vehicle’s movements,
changing the battery at least once while the vehicle was parked in
another public lot in Maryland. 20 The GPS tracking device recorded more
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

SHAKESPEARE, supra note 4.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
Id. at 946.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 947.
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than two thousand pages of location data over the twenty-eight day
period. 21
Based in part on the information gathered from the use of the GPS
tracking device, the government was able to obtain a multiple-count
indictment charging Jones and other coconspirators with conspiracy to
distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, cocaine and cocaine
base.22 Jones filed a motion in the district court to suppress the evidence
obtained through use of the GPS device without a warrant.23 The district
court granted the motion in part as it related to data obtained while the
vehicle was parked in a garage at Jones’s residence, but denied the
motion as it related to data obtained while the vehicle was traveling on
public roads. 24 The lower court based its ruling on the Supreme Court’s
holding in United States v. Knotts,25 that “[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”26 Jones’s first trial
ended in a hung jury on the conspiracy count. 27
In March 2007, Jones and others were again indicted on the
conspiracy count.28 At the new trail, the government introduced the same
GPS location data presented in the first trial and on this evidence Jones
was convicted of conspiracy and received a life sentence. 29 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed Jones’s
conviction, holding that the admission of the evidence obtained by the
warrantless use of the GPS tracking device violated the Fourth
Amendment.30 The District of Columbia Circuit Court denied the
government’s petition for rehearing en banc, with four judges
dissenting.31 Following this denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
on July 27, 2011,32 and oral arguments were heard on November 8,
2011.33
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 281.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
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Constitutional Precedent Leading up to Jones

At the time of Jones, there were several existing Supreme Court
decisions the Court could have used to help resolve the issue of “whether
the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to
an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 34 Principal among the
existing precedent was the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz v. United
States,35 which established the reasonable expectation of privacy test—a
search under the Fourth Amendment occurs only when an expectation of
privacy that society considers reasonable is invaded. 36
In Katz, the FBI attached an electronic listening device to the
exterior of a telephone booth used by defendant for illegal gambling and
recorded the defendant’s conversations, which were later used as
evidence to convict the defendant of wire fraud. 37 The Supreme Court
held that the defendant sought to exclude others when he entered the
enclosed telephone booth, which allowed him to assume that his
conversations were private and would not be “broadcast to the world.” 38
The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he government’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated
the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.”39
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test informed the
Supreme Court’s decision in numerous situations, including thermal
imaging, 40 aerial observations,41 curbside trash,42 dog sniff tests, 43 and
(2012)
(No.
10-1259),
available
at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
34. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Augmented by Justice Harlan’s
concurring opinion, the Court adopted a two-part test for determining when a “search”
had occurred under the Fourth Amendment: “first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id.
37. Id. at 348 (majority opinion).
38. Id. at 353.
39. Id. at 353.
40. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding thermal imaging
technology used to detect heat emanating for the home of the defendant constituted a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
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traffic stops.44 But perhaps the most relevant precedent the Jones Court
could have relied on involved the installation and use of beepers,
arguably the closest predecessor to GPS technology.
United States v. Knotts45 was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity
to address whether the use of beepers to track a defendant’s location
constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. In Knotts, the
Supreme Court held that monitoring beeper signals was “neither a
‘search’ nor a ‘seizure’ within the contemplation of the Fourth
Amendment”46 because monitoring beeper signals did not infringe upon
the defendant’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 47 In Knotts, law
enforcement, suspecting the defendant of illegal activity, arranged to
have a beeper placed inside a container of chloroform that was purchased
by the defendant for use in the manufacture of illegal drugs. 48 After the
defendant purchased the container with the beeper, the officers followed
the defendant’s vehicle using a monitor that picked up the beeper’s
signal, as well as visual surveillance of the defendant. 49 Using the beeper
signal, officers eventually traced the container of chloroform to the
defendant’s cabin.50 Police obtained a search warrant, relying primarily
on the information obtained by use of the beeper, and discovered an
illegal drug operation.51 The Court concluded that while the defendant
may have had a subjective expectation of privacy in his movements, “[a]
person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
41. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding aerial observation of
the defendant’s home during helicopter flyover was not a search under Fourth
Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-39 (1986) (holding
aerial observation of an industrial plant was not a search under Fourth Amendment);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (holding aerial observation of curtilage of
defendant’s home was not a search).
42. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) (holding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in trash left at curbside outside defendant’s home).
43. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding no Fourth
Amendment violation when officers subjected defendant’s luggage to a “dog sniff” test).
44. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding defendants did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in vehicle which they did not claim an ownership
interest).
45. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
46. Id. at 285.
47. See id. at 284-85.
48. Id. at 277-78.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 279.
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another.”52 The Court reasoned that following the beeper signal was
analogous to visual surveillance of the vehicle while traveling on the
public roads and highways.53
Just over a year later, on almost identical facts, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue again in United States v. Karo.54 In Karo, after
obtaining a court order to install and monitor a tracking beeper in a can
of ether, which agents suspected would be used by the defendant “to
extract cocaine from clothing that had been imported into the United
States,”55 the agents used the tracking device and visual surveillance to
monitor the can’s whereabouts.56 The agents relied primarily on the
beeper signal, which led them to a residence rented by one of the
defendants.57 The agents obtained a warrant to search one of the
defendant’s homes “based in part on information derived through use of
the beeper.”58 Upon execution of the warrant, the agents found drug
manufacturing equipment. 59 Relying on the Katz analysis, the Court
affirmed the rationale of Knotts regarding the constitutionality of
monitoring the beeper while on public roads, 60 but concluded that
monitoring the beeper while it was located in a private residence violated
the Fourth Amendment and the rights of “those who ha[d] a justifiable
interest in the privacy of the residence.” 61
Whereas Katz, Knotts, and Karo represented what most legal
scholars and jurists believed to be the constitutional framework by which
the Court would decide Jones, many were left utterly shocked by the
Court’s almost total rejection of these previous constitutional precedents
in favor of a doctrine that most believed was dead—the “trespass
doctrine.”62 Legal scholars and jurists alike, for decades, had interpreted
52. Id. at 281.
53. Id. at 281-82.
54. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
55. Id. at 708.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 708-10.
58. Id. at 710.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 713-15; see also April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The
Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space
Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 678 (2005) (“[T]he Court . . .
implicitly accepted Knotts’s rationale regarding the constitutionality of DEA officers’
monitoring of the beeper as it moved on public thoroughfares.”).
61. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
62. The “trespass doctrine” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was first
articulated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and is based on the
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Katz as replacing, if not overruling, the trespass doctrine, 63 since the
Court so explicitly and emphatically declined to resolve the issue in Katz
upon a property-based theory.64 Katz’s complete denouncement 65 of a
property-based resolution left many to wonder about the fate of the
trespass doctrine and the future of property-based Fourth Amendment
arguments—that is, until Jones.
C.

The Jones Decision

On January 23, 2012, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the
warrantless installation and use of a GPS tracking device to track the
movements of a suspect’s vehicle constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.66 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, wrote for the majority: “We
hold that the [g]overnment’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s
vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements,
constitutes a ‘search.’”67 Though the decision was unanimous, the Court
was split on which constitutional precedent to use to resolve the issue—
the older “trespass doctrine” first announced in Olmstead v. United
concept that “the [F]ourth [A]mendment protected ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’
when these entities were located within a ‘constitutionally protected area.’” David P.
Miraldi, Comment, The Relationship Between Trespass and Fourth Amendment
Protection After Katz v. United States, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 709, 710 (1977); see also
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (relying on the opinion in
Olmstead, the Supreme Court held that the use of an electronic recording device did not
infringe upon the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant because no physical trespass
occurred into the home or curtilage of the defendant).
63. See Miraldi, supra note 62, at 712.
Some lower federal courts have read Katz as expanding [F]ourth
[A]mendment protection by merely supplementing the trespass
doctrine. On the other hand, some lower federal courts have focused
upon Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion and have read Katz as
completely replacing the trespass doctrine with the reasonable
expectation of privacy test.
Id. (footnotes omitted). But see id. at 732-33 (supporting the continued use of the trespass
doctrine together with the Katz reasonable expectation test).
64. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[T]he underpinnings of
Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the
‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”).
65. Id.
66. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948-54 (2012).
67. Id. at 949 (footnote omitted).
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States,68 or the reasonable expectation of privacy test announced in
Katz.69
The five-Justice majority opted to return to the property-driven
concept, the trespass doctrine, first articulated in Olmstead.70 In relying
on the trespass doctrine, the majority reasoned that applying commonlaw trespass principles best preserved the degree of privacy against
government intrusion that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s
adoption, stating that “[w]e have no doubt that such a physical intrusion
would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when it was adopted.”71 After asserting that “[i]t is beyond
dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is used in the [Fourth]
Amendment,”72 the majority had no problem finding a Fourth
Amendment violation. The Court declined to address much deeper issues
such as the significance of the vehicle’s ownership, which was registered
in Jones’s wife’s name, or whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the vehicle’s undercarriage or in the vehicle’s movements
along public roads.73 The majority supports its refusal to delve into these
deeper issues by asserting that historically the Fourth Amendment has
always embodied concerns regarding governmental intrusion into
areas—”persons, houses, papers, and effects.”74 The majority states that
this understanding was not repudiated by Katz.75 Although the majority
did not altogether ignore Katz, stating that Katz was not a substitute for
earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the use of the trespass
doctrine, but rather that Katz provided an additional test to be applied
when there was no physical trespass involved, 76 the majority nevertheless
refused to address any Katz-related issues in the absence of a physical
trespass, stating that “[w]e may have to grapple with these ‘vexing
68. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). In Olmstead, federal agents installed wire
taps in the streets outside the defendant’s home. Id. at 456-57. The Olmstead court held
that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated since there was no
trespassing into the defendant’s home or curtilage. Id. at 466; accord Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1942).
69. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
70. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-50.
71. Id. at 949.
72. Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)).
73. Id. at 949-50. The Court stated: “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall
with the Katz [reasonable expectation of privacy test].” Id. at 950.
74. See id. at 953.
75. Id. at 950.
76. Id. at 952-53.
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problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not
involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason
for rushing forward to resolve them here.” 77
Nevertheless, in response to Justice Alito’s concurrence and the
government’s contentions, the majority seemed compelled to address the
Court’s previous constitutional precedent by distinguishing the Court’s
earlier precedent from the present case. 78 Responding to Justice Alito’s
argument that post-Katz precedent explained that “an actual trespass is
neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation,” 79
the majority found that this argument was “undoubtedly true [yet]
undoubtedly irrelevant,”80 since the cases upon which Justice Alito (and
the government) relied are factually distinguishable. 81 Arguing from the
premise that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has been
added to, and is not a substitute for, the trespass doctrine, 82 the majority
reasoned that Knotts and Karo were not applicable because neither
addressed the issue of trespass.83 In each case, as noted by the majority,
the beeper was placed in the container prior to coming into the
possession of the defendant and, therefore, neither defendant could
object to the beeper’s presence.84 For this reason, the majority concluded
77. Id. at 954.
78. Id. at 951-52. But see Myers Morrison, supra note 8, at 118.
[T]o distinguish Jones from Knotts and Karo on the basis that the
former involved a trespass and the latter two did not seems to
deliberately ignore the more salient difference between the cases. The
surveillance in Knotts lasted a single trip and the surveillance in Karo
only a couple trips. The surveillance in Jones was a 24-hour a day,
28-day operation.
Id.
79. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)).
80. Id. at 951 n.5 (majority opinion).
81. Id. at 951-52.
82. Id. at 952. The majority stated that Katz “established that ‘property rights are
not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,’ but did not ‘snuf[f] out the
previously recognized protection of property.’” Id. (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., Ill.,
506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992). The majority went on the explain that “[a]s Justice Brennan
explained in his concurrence in Knotts, Katz did not erode the principle ‘that, when the
[g]overnment does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in
order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983)).
83. See id. at 952.
84. See id.
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that the defendant in Jones “is on much different footing,”85 since the
defendant possessed the vehicle prior to the government’s trespassory
invasion. 86 In addition, though the majority saw no need to delve into any
Katz-like analysis, 87 it did make clear that the Katz analysis would apply
in cases involving “merely the transmission of electronic signals without
trespass.”88
Although in accord with the Court’s decision, Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion, which is joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan, is very critical of the majority’s opinion because the latter
entirely ignores post-Katz constitutional precedent (namely Knotts and
Karo), which primarily focused on determining whether expectations of
privacy are reasonable. 89 The true issue for Justice Alito is “whether
respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove” 90—a
question Justice Alito answers affirmatively. 91 This, according to Justice
Alito, is the case’s most important issue and one Justice Alito contends
the majority largely ignored. 92 While Justice Alito was clear to note that
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test has its complications, he
also notes that the Katz test avoids several key problems raised by the
majority opinion, including potential incongruous results.93 According to
Justice Alito, the majority’s approach would have led to a different result
if the defendant in Jones had gained exclusive possession of the vehicle
in question after the GPS was installed. 94 Similarly, Justice Alito notes
that if the ownership of the vehicle in which the defendant was driving is

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 947.
Id. at 953.
See id. at 959-60 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 958.
Id. at 964.
In this case, for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every
movement that respondent made in the vehicle he was driving. We
need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this
vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4week mark.

Id. (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 961.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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relevant, an issue the majority refuses to address, 95 results “may vary
from State to State” depending on marital property laws. 96 Moreover, as
further noted by Justice Alito, the majority’s opinion fails to address
issues involving surveillance without a physical trespass.97 As Justice
Alito sees it, in this day and age of new technology where law
enforcement is no longer constrained by practical considerations, 98 the
best that the Court can do is apply current constitutional doctrine and ask
“whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree
of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.” 99
Under this approach, Justice Alito would find that the government’s use
of the GPS device over a four-week period was sufficient to violate the
Fourth Amendment, although he declined to state at what point within
the four-week period the tracking became a search. 100
Justice Sotomayor, though joining the majority, wrote a separate
concurring opinion that also criticizes the narrow focus of the majority’s
opinion and its refusal to address critical issues involving the use of
advanced technology that do not involve a physical trespass.101 Justice
Sotomayor joined in the majority opinion only because she agreed that,
at a minimum, a search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment “‘[w]here . . . the [g]overnment obtains information by
physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.’” 102 However,
Justice Sotomayor thought the Court should focus on social norms and
societal expectations. 103 Justice Sotomayor explains that she “would take
the[] attributes of GPS monitoring into account when considering the
existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of
one’s public movements.”104 She states specifically that she “would ask
whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded
95. See id. at 949 n.2 (majority opinion) (concluding that there was no issue
regarding the status of Jones as merely the user of the vehicle rather than the vehicle’s
owner since the government did not object to the Court of Appeals’ determination that
registration of the vehicle did not affect Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights.)
96. Id. at 961-62 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
97. See id. at 958-59.
98. See id. at 963 (“In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy
were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical.”).
99. Id. at 964.
100. Id. at 964 (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking
of this vehicle became a search . . . .”).
101. See id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 954 (quoting id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion)).
103. See id. at 956.
104. Id.
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and aggregated in a manner that enables the [g]overnment to ascertain,
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits,
and so on.”105 Under this rubric, Justice Sotomayor would find, as Justice
Alito does, that long-term GPS tracking impinges on reasonable
expectations of privacy and would therefore violate the Fourth
Amendment.106 However, she saw no reason why shorter term
monitoring in certain situations involving GPS technology, because of its
unique attributes, would not also require particular attention by the
Court.107
To be sure, the Court’s ruling leaves many unanswered questions
regarding the use of GPS technology in the wake of privacy concerns. So
what are we to take from the Court’s decision? Since many of the
significant issues were left unanswered, 108 the Jones decision may be of
little relevance for future cases involving technologically advanced
surveillance and tracking, especially in light of emerging technology,
including social media, that allows the tracking or monitoring of a person
without any physical trespass.109 Moreover, even with the Court’s
clarification that Katz should be applied in cases without a physical
trespass, because the Court, including Justices Alito and Sotomayor in
their respective concurring opinions, declined to address at which point
within the four-week period the surveillance of Jones became a search
(i.e., exceeded reasonable expectations society is prepared to
recognize), 110 Jones adds very little to the post-Katz formulation of
105. Id.
106. Id. at 955 (“I agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”
(quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)).
107. Id. at 955. Justice Sotomayor was very concerned with the sheer quality and
quantity of information the government was capable of collecting on the defendant in
Jones, noting that “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.” Id.
108. Justices Sotomayor and Alito each criticized the majority for failing to address
several key questions, the most significant of which was whether the actions of the police
in Jones constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment regardless
of whether there was a common law trespass, given the realities of enhanced surveillance
technology and societal expectations. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
958-61 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
109. Justices Sotomayor and Alito each made passionate arguments about the
pervasiveness of emerging technology and its effects on societal norms and reasonable
expectations. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring
in judgment).
110. See id. 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment).
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reasonable expectations.
Notwithstanding that Jones may clarify certain doctrinal principles
regarding what constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, this clarification may be merely a matter of form over
substance in this wireless digital information age because Jones did not
add any additional insight into the otherwise murky area of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence regarding electronic surveillance and
tracking.
D.

Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence After Jones

The Court in Jones ultimately failed to address the sweeping Fourth
Amendment implications of the use of GPS or similar tracking devices,
specifically, whether the warrantless use of GPS or similar tracking
devices constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment when there is no physical trespass involved. However, the
Jones decision does provide some marginal insight into the Court’s likely
future interpretation of the doctrinal definition of what constitutes a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.
1. Doctrinal Definition of “Search” Prior to Jones
Historically, the doctrinal definition of a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment involved some physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area and, thus, trespass became the driving
force behind Fourth Amendment protection. 111 This concept became
known as the “trespass doctrine” and is based on the concept that “the
[F]ourth [A]mendment protect[s] ‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’
when these entities [are] located in a ‘constitutionally protected area.’” 112
The “trespass doctrine” was the primary force behind Fourth
Amendment protection for more than three decades, 113 until the Court
111. See Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 423 (2007)
(“Prior to Katz, the Court largely defined a search as a function of some physical invasion
by the government.”); Miraldi, supra note 62, at 710-11 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
use of the “trespass doctrine” as the thrust behind Fourth Amendment protection).
112. Miraldi, supra note 62, at 710.
113. See McDonald Hutchins, supra note 111, at 425 (“The Court continued to
explicitly and implicitly endorse the analytical model requiring actual physical invasion
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began to slowly break away from a property-based paradigm to a
privacy-based paradigm. 114 The Court’s decision in Katz marked the
break from the use of the trespass doctrine. 115 The Katz Court
vehemently rejected any Fourth Amendment arguments based on
whether there was a physical trespass, stating that “the underpinnings of
Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions
that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as
controlling.”116 Instead, the Court, aided by Justice Harlan’s concurring
opinion, adopted the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, 117
which requires a showing that a person has a legitimate expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 118 It is against
this backdrop that the Jones decision becomes relevant.
2. Doctrinal Definition of “Search” After Jones
As discussed earlier, the majority opinion in Jones declined to use
the pre-existing Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test as the basis
for its holding, asserting that “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not
rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”119 Instead, Justice Scalia
formulated what may be deemed a new test, or at least a clarification of
the previous test, to determine when a government intrusion constitutes a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia’s new definition of
a “search” provides that a government intrusion will constitute a search
as a necessary element of any Fourth Amendment search for another three decades before
rejecting it in its entirety.”).
114. See Jace C. Gatewood, Warrantless GPS Surveillance: Search and Seizure –
Using the Right to Exclude to Address the Constitutionality of GPS Tracking Systems
Under the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 303, 363-65 (2011) (discussing the
shift from a property-based paradigm to a privacy based-paradigm under the Fourth
Amendment).
115. Id. at 365 (“Katz marked the first articulation of the Court’s outright rejection
of a property-based analysis, stating that the Fourth Amendment’s reach ‘cannot turn
upon the presence or absence of physical intrusion into any enclosure.’”).
116. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
117. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
118. See id.; Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (“[The] capacity to claim
the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who
claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place.” (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 353)).
119. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
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within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if the intrusion: (i)
constitutes a common law physical trespass;120 (ii) invades a
constitutionally protected area enumerated in the Fourth Amendment:
“persons, houses, papers, and effects”;121 and, (iii) is done “for the
purpose of obtaining information,” 122 or is “an attempt to find something
or to obtain information.”123 In addition, the majority opinion makes
clear that this new formulation does not prevent the use of the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test in cases involving government
intrusion where there is no physical trespass, thus preserving Katz and its
progeny. 124 Hence, after Jones, there are now two doctrinal bases upon
which a defendant may challenge investigative techniques employed by
law enforcement: the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the
Jones newly formulated trespassory test.125
However, notwithstanding the new formulation and clarification
under Jones, in this technologically advanced society with the advent of
computers, smartphones, and other wireless electronics devices capable
of remotely eliciting information so vast and comprehensive, neither
Katz nor Jones may be far reaching enough to find a Fourth Amendment
violation for such an elicitation—a Katz analysis is not satisfied because
of the complexity and the pervasiveness of the technology used, and a
Jones analysis is not satisfied because there is no common-law trespass.

120. Id. at 949. After finding that a vehicle was an “effect” for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court concluded that “[t]he [g]overnment physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a
physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” Id. The Court further clarified that “obtaining .
. . information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such . . . trespass or invasion
of privacy.” Id. at 951 n.5.
121. Id. at 950 (“[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood
to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses,
papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”).
122. Id. at 949. In defining “search” the Supreme Court explains “[a] trespass on
‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done
to obtain information . . . .” Id. at 951 n.5 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 951 n.5. The Court makes a further clarification in defining search:
“Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that what was present
here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information.” Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 953. The majority states, in response to Justice Alito’s concurrence,
“[f]or unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make
trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without a trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
125. See id.
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3. Practical Value of Jones
Jones may be of little value in this ever-advancing digital age where
the breadth and depth of technology make police investigative methods
less physically intrusive, less costly, and more comprehensive. As stated
by Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion, “physical intrusion is
now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.” 126 For this reason,
Justice Sotomayor points out that the majority opinion’s trespassory test
provides little guidance on “cases of electronic or other novel modes of
surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property . . .
.”127 Justice Alito shares in this sentiment and raises a very thoughtprovoking question. Assuming that what matters most to the majority’s
position is “the law of trespass as it existed at the time of the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment,”128 would sending of an unwanted electronic
signal that makes contact with an electronic device constitute a
trespass?129 His point being that there remains a question as to whether
an electronic transmission equates to a physical touching as required by
common-law trespass.130
But, perhaps even more troublesome to Justice Alito was the
majority’s outright refusal to engage in any Katz analysis,131 even though
both Justices Alito and Sotomayor also had concerns over the application
of Katz.132 While pointing out observations made by Justice Alito, Justice
Sotomayor states “the same technological advances that . . . [make]
possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect the Katz
test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”133 On this
point, Justice Alito adds, “[t]he availability and use of [smartphones and
other wireless devices] will continue to shape the average person’s
expectations about the privacy of his or her daily movements.” 134 Justice
126. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 961 (“Disharmony with a substantial body of existing case law is
only one of the problems with the Court’s approach in this case.”).
132. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he same technological
advances that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will also affect
the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy expectations.”); id. at 962
(Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (acknowledging that Katz is “not without its own
difficulties.”).
133. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
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Alito’s position is that, with the reshaping of societal expectations, the
Court’s only role should be to assess whether the particular use of the
device in question “involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable
person would not have anticipated,” 135 and that the rest should be left to
Congress and the States.136
According to the majority, the problems posed by the application of
Katz extend far beyond the mere determination of whether it was
necessary to engage in a Katz analysis to resolve the issue in Jones. 137
The issue that the majority finds “particularly vexing” 138 is why, as
indicated by Justice Alito, under a Katz analysis a “[four]-week
investigation [was] ‘surely’ too long and why a drug-trafficking
conspiracy involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics is not an
‘extraordinary offens[e]’ which may permit longer observation.” 139 The
majority’s query therefore considers the extent to which the Court should
consider the nature of the offense being investigated140 in order to
determine the scope of reasonableness of the investigation. 141 These and
other perplexing questions present a “novelty into [Fourth Amendment]
jurisprudence”142 for which there is no precedent.143
Clearly the “sound and fury”144 of the Justices leaves in flux the
precise application of Jones and Katz to future cases involving electronic
surveillance and tracking. Furthermore, several critical questions remain
unanswered—some of which are raised by the Justices themselves—
regarding the application of Jones or Katz to purely electronic intrusions,
whether in terms of duration of the intrusion, the physical nature of the
intrusion, the scope or depth of the intrusion, or the nature of the
investigation. Whatever the case, Jones provides very little guidance to
law enforcement officials and lower courts concerning permissible
Fourth Amendment conduct when electronic, technologically advanced

135. Id. at 964.
136. See id. at 964.
137. See id. at 953-54 (majority opinion).
138. Id. at 953.
139. Id. at 954.
140. See id. The majority questioned “[w]hat of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected
purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a suspected terrorist?” Id.
141. See id. The Court ultimately concluded that it was necessary to “grapple with
these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not
involved and resort must be had to Katz analysis . . . .” Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 4.
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devices or investigatory methods are used as a means to gather evidence.
III. Emerging Technology and the Limitations of Jones and Katz
The boundary between privacy and emerging technologies goes far
beyond the recent debate over the use of GPS technology. With the rise
of social networking technologies—smartphones, factory installed GPSequipped vehicles, smartcards, electronic toll and highway security
cameras, license-plate recognition systems, and other wireless devices—
privacy concerns are becoming more important and more prevalent. 145
These emerging technologies pose numerous challenges in the wake of
privacy concerns. 146 While would-be criminals have found it increasingly
easier to commit sophisticated crimes while evading detection using
advanced technology, law enforcement officials have similarly used this
advanced technology to become more cost effective and efficient in
foiling the would-be criminal. Alas, however, criminals are not
constrained by the Fourth Amendment, only the government is.
The government’s use of sophisticated surveillance and
investigatory methods—like the GPS technology at issue in Jones—
raises serious concern over the degree of permissible government
intrusion.147 However, it is plainly evident that the most common uses of
145. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that
permit the monitoring of a person’s movements. In some locales,
closed-circuit television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous.
On toll roads, automatic . . . collection systems create a precise record
of the movements of motorists . . . . Many motorists purchase cars
that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to
ascertain the car’s location at any time . . . .
Id.
146. See Protecting Civil Liberties in the Digital Age, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (“A
constant stream of revolutionary new technologies erode existing protections, and greatly
expanded powers for our security agencies allow the government to peer into our lives
without due process or meaningful oversight. Our rights and liberties have undergone
constant erosion since 9/11.”).
147. Justice Sotomayor had very serious concerns, specifically stating that she
would “consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any
oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of
the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to and [sic]
prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J.
concurring) (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
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technological investigatory methods employed by the government do not
actually violate the Fourth Amendment under the proscriptions of Jones
or Katz as currently interpreted. A few examples of emerging technology
and other investigatory techniques used by law enforcement as
investigatory tools illustrate this point.
A.

Automatic License-Plate Recognition Systems

According to some estimates, automatic license-plate recognitions
systems are capable of scanning more than 1500 license-plates per
minute. 148 These systems are used by numerous law enforcement
agencies as a method to electronically collect tolls or for recording the
movements of traffic or individuals, among other things. 149 Police
departments in Maryland are using license-plate recognition systems and
are sharing the collected data with an antiterrorism agency run jointly by
federal, state, and local authorities. 150 In Connecticut, license-plate
recognition systems are being used to track parking violations, 151 while
Florida uses the technology to track gang members.152 The federal
government is also using license-plate scanners in Texas and California
along known drug trafficking corridors.153 Local media outlets are
reporting almost daily on the ever-expansive use of license-plate
scanners.154 These systems use optical character recognition software to
read vehicle registration plates. 155 The issue that these license-plate
recognition systems present is their indiscriminate use, capturing the
license-plate information of all passing vehicles and storing the
information into databases which over time can be used to track the
movements of unsuspecting individuals—both criminals and law abiding
148. See Hilary Hylton, License-Plate Scanners: Fighting Crime or Invading
Privacy?,
TIME
(July
30,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1913258,00.html.
149. See Adam Cohen, Is Your Car Being Tracked by a License-Plate Scanner?,
TIME (Aug. 13, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/08/13/is-your-car-being-tracked-by-alicense-plate-scanner/ (reporting that the American Civil Liberties Union is looking at
how the government uses license-plate recognition systems in at least 38 states.).
150. Id.
151. Hylton, supra note 148.
152. Id.
153. Cohen, supra note 149.
154. One only needs to perform a Google search of the phrase “license-plate
scanners” for an on-going list of reports concerning the use and privacy concerns of
license-plate scanners.
155. Hylton, supra note 148.
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citizens.156 As one author sees it, “[t]he real problem is that when the
government stores that information, it is not trying to solve an ongoing
crime—it is building a database. These databases can quickly fill up with
all sorts of details about how people lead their lives.” 157 More critical to
his argument is the fact that the details in the database may be pieced
together over time to create a profile about certain aspects of an
individual’s life, including whether they attend church, have any political
affiliations, or have a mistress.158 This aggregating effect, known as the
“mosaic theory,”159 was precisely what mostly concerned Justice
Sotomayor in Jones.160 Yet, evaluating the use of these automatic
license-plate recognition systems under Jones or Katz makes clear that
the constitutionality of such a system is dubious at best.
156. See id.
157. Cohen, supra note 149.
158. See id.
159. “Mosaic theory” refers to the theory that the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts and that the aggregation of information may be covered by a reasonable
expectation of privacy even if the individual parts are not. See United States v. Maynard,
615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010) aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012). In rejecting the government’s contention that no distinction should be drawn
between the information discovered by use of a beeper in a single discrete journey at
issue in Knotts and the more comprehensive monitoring at issue in Maynard, the circuit
court applied the mosaic theory, stating that
[T]he totality of Jones's movements over the course of a month—was
not exposed to the public: First, unlike one's movements during a
single journey, the whole of one's movements over the course of a
month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood
anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil. Second,
the whole of one's movements is not exposed constructively even
though each individual movement is exposed, because that whole
reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of
its parts.
Id.; accord Madelaine Virginia Ford, Comment, Mosaic Theory and the Fourth
Amendment: How Jones Can Save Privacy in the Face of Evolving Technology, 19 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 1351, 1364 (2011) (“The mosaic theory is a novel theory
in the Fourth Amendment context and it could dramatically change privacy
jurisprudence”). But see Benjamin M. Ostrander, Note, The “Mosaic Theory” and Fourth
Amendment Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1733, 1748 (2011) (“The application of the
‘mosaic theory’ to the Fourth Amendment would not only be wrong in principle, it would
be impractical in application.”).
160. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Concerned about
the degree of intrusiveness capable with GPS technology, Justice Sotomayor questioned
“whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated
in a manner that enables the [g]overnment to ascertain, more or less at will, their political
and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Id. at 956.
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First, under Jones, there would be no Fourth Amendment violation
since automatic license-plate systems require no physical touching of the
vehicle. 161 Even assuming, arguendo, that the electronic transmission
used to read the license-plate is deemed a physical touching, Jones still
presents a problem. Generally, these license-plate recognition systems
are used indiscriminately on all drivers within its vicinity and not for the
purpose of obtaining information in connection with an investigation. 162
If nothing else, Jones made clear that “[a] trespass on ‘houses’ or
‘effects,’ or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is
done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone
a search unless it is achieved by such trespass or invasion of property.” 163
Obviously, such devices obtain information. However, it is not clear
from Jones whether the information must be obtained in connection with
an investigation occurring at the time the information is collected, or
whether the information can be collected fortuitously and then used later
to investigate potential crimes.
Likewise under Katz, the use of license-plate recognition systems
should not be objectionable. Since these systems only record short bursts
of information at designated points, either while mounted on police cars
or at toll booths, they may be even more analogous to visual surveillance
than the beeper technology in Knotts and Karo, and certainly much less
intrusive than the GPS technology at issue in Jones. Moreover, the Jones
court left open the question whether shorter periods of surveillance or
tracking would amount to a search under Katz.164 At least three other

161. This argument necessarily assumes that the electronic transmission used to
read a license-plate is not considered a physical touching. This issue is raised by Justice
Alito, who questioned whether “the sending of a radio signal to activate [a vehicle
detection system would] constitute a trespass of chattels . . . .” Id. at 962 (Alito, J.,
concurring in judgment). Justice Alito also questioned whether the application of
common law trespass could reconcile recent decisions involving unwanted electronic
contact with computer systems, as he notes that some courts have held “that even the
transmission of electrons that occurs when a communication is sent from one computer to
another is enough.” Id. at 962 (citations omitted); accord Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (interpreting the Katz majority as holding that
“electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place that is in this sense private”
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
162. See Cohen, supra note 149.
163. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5.
164. Justice Scalia criticizes the concurring opinions for stating that investigations
lasting four weeks are “surely” too long. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. Justice Sotomayor
questioned whether shorter periods of surveillance than the four-week period in Jones
might be unreasonable under certain circumstances, but never resolved the issue. Id. at
955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Alito thought that the “line was surely crossed
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Justices support Justice Alito’s position that “relatively short-term
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.” 165
Hence the primary issue that neither Jones nor Katz addresses is whether
the “mosaic theory” accords with the proscriptions of the Fourth
Amendment.166 As alluded to by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito in
their respective concurring opinions, there may be situations in which
tracking is so comprehensive it may be deemed unreasonable for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.167
B.

Smartphone/Cell Phone Tracking

Most smartphones today are equipped with GPS tracking
capability,168 meaning they can be tracked in the same manner as a GPSequipped vehicle. In this sense, a GPS equipped smartphone can be used
to track its own location, and by extension, the person or vehicle carrying
it.169 In addition, it was recently reported that many smartphones are
equipped with Carrier IQ software that monitors keystrokes, location,
and received messages.170 Even the smartphone’s predecessor, the cell
before the 4-week mark,” but declined to address at what point in the four-week
investigation the surveillance amounted to a search. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment).
165. Id.
166. Justice Sotomayor indicated that she would “take the[] attributes of GPS
monitoring into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.” Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). Justice Alito also seems to be in accord with Justice Sotomayor when he
states, “for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every movement that respondent
made in the vehicle he was driving.” Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)
(emphasis added).
167. See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment).
168. See Bonnie Cha, Road Warrior: Smartphones with Built-in GPS, CNET (May
14, 2010), http://reviews.cnet.com/4321-6452_7-6564140.html (“GPS on smartphones is
no longer an emerging trend. It’s almost a must-have feature nowadays, and more and
more handsets are offering it.”).
169. Smartphones may also be tracked using Wi-Fi. See Adrian Kingsley-Hughes,
Your Smartphone Allows You to be Tracked Wherever You Go, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2012,
11:19
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adriankingsleyhughes/2012/04/21/yoursmartphone-allows-you-to-be-tracked-wherever-you-go/ (“New technology by locations
services firm Navizon allows anyone carrying a Wi Fi-equipped [S]martphone to be
tracked without their knowledge or consent.”).
170. See Kevin Dolak, Carrie IQ: Does Your Smartphone Have It, and Is It
Tracking
You?,
ABC
NEWS
(Dec.
1,
2011,
10:51
AM),
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phone, may be tracked as long as it is turned on. 171 Cell phones register
their location with the nearest cell tower every few minutes, whether or
not the cell phone is in use. 172 Mobile carriers often retain location and
other personal data for months, and in some cases years.173 As a result, an
individual’s location history and other detailed personal information may
be accessed by law enforcement directly from the cell phone carrier
using a third-party subpoena, including what establishments they
frequent, where they buy their groceries, what friends they visit, where
they go to church, and so on. 174 All of this is obtained without a warrant
and without the individual’s knowledge. 175
While the Supreme Court has yet to directly evaluate the
constitutionality of smartphone or cell phone tracking, the Sixth Circuit’s
recent decision in United States v. Skinner sheds light on how the Court
may view this issue under Jones or Katz.176 In Skinner, the government
obtained a court order authorizing the defendant’s cell phone company to
release certain data pertaining to a pay-as-you-go phone, and ultimately
discovered that the cell phone was used by the defendant in connection
with drug trafficking.177 The data obtained by the government from the
cell phone company included, “subscriber information, cell site
information, GPS real-time location, and ‘ping’ data . . . .”178 Using this
information, agents tracked the defendant as he transported drugs
between Arizona and Tennessee179 by continuously “pinging”180 his
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2011/12/is-your-smartphone-tracking-yourkeystrokes-texts-and-location/.
171. See Government Location Tracking: Cell Phones, GPS Devices, and Licence
Plate Readers, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/government-cell-phone-and-gps-locationtracking (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Government Location Tracking].
172. Id.
173. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Request Response – Cell Phone Company
Data Retention Chart, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-requestresponse-cell-phone-company-data-retention-chart (last visited Mar. 16, 2013).
174. See Government Location Tracking, supra note 171.
175. Id.
176. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
177. Id. at 774.
178. Id. at 776.
179. Id. at 774.
180. Id. at 776.
A cell phone “ping” is quite simply the process of determining
the location, with reasonable accuracy, of a cell phone at any given
point in time by utilizing the phone GPS location aware capabilities,
it is very similar to GPS vehicle tracking systems. To “ping” in this
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phone to locate its whereabouts.181 As a result of the tracking
information, the defendant was eventually apprehended in Texas with
more than 1100 pounds of marijuana. 182 After the defendant’s motion to
suppress this evidence was denied, he was convicted on two counts of
drug trafficking and one count of conspiracy to commit money
laundering.183 The Sixth Circuit, applying a Katz analysis, held that the
defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
location from which the data was emanating from his cell phone. 184 The
court reasoned that “[i]f a tool used to transport contraband gives off a
signal that can be tracked for location, certainly the police can track the
signal.”185 The court equated the use of the phone’s trackability to the
trackability of a car by use of its license-plate or the trackability of a
fugitive by use of his scent. 186 In this sense, the court found that the
inherent trackability of the phone negated reasonable expectations of
privacy in the same way a “driver of a getaway car has no expectation of
privacy in the particular combination of colors of the car’s paint.” 187
Interestingly enough, the court would similarly apply this rationale to all
cell phone users because of the phone’s “inherent external
locatability.”188
The Sixth Circuit found support for its decision in Knotts, stating
that “[s]imilar to the circumstances in Knotts, Skinner was traveling on a
public road before he stopped at a public rest stop. While the cell site
information aided the police in determining Skinner’s location, that same
information could have been obtained through visual surveillance.” 189 In
addition, the Sixth Circuit found support in its own precedent. In United
context means to send a signal to a particular cell phone and have it
respond with the requested data. The term is derived from SONAR
and echolocation when a technician would send out a sound wave, or
ping, and wait for its return to locate another object.
L. Scott Harrell, Locating Mobile Phones through Pinging and Triangulation, PURSUIT
MAG. (July 1, 2008), http://pursuitmag.com/locating-mobile-phones-through-pingingand-triangulation/.
181. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 777.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 777 n.1.
189. Id. at 778.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss2/4

26

GATEWOOD Macro Final

2013]

7/26/2013 4:49 PM

IT’S RAINING KATZ AND JONES

709

States v. Forest,190 DEA agents, who suspected that the defendant was
traveling to meet alleged drug couriers, called the defendant’s cell phone
several times, hanging up before it could ring, in order to “ping” the cell
phone’s location.191 The agents tracked the defendant using this location
information, and the next day they arrested the defendant at a gas
station. 192 Following the Knotts rationale, the Sixth Circuit found that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation because the agents could have
obtained the same information by visually following the defendant’s
vehicle. 193
Arguably, the issue in Skinner would have been patently different if
the GPS technology at issue in Jones had been used in a similar manner
to track the cell phone rather than the “pinging” system, which may be
arguably more similar to the beeper technology used in Knotts and Karo,
because of the level of comprehensive tracking that took place in
Jones.194 For this reason, the Sixth Circuit was quick to distinguish the
level of tracking in Skinner with the level of tracking in Jones,195 noting
that, while the Supreme Court in Jones “recognized that there is little
precedent for what constitutes a level of comprehensive tracking that
would violate the Fourth Amendment,” 196 the Skinner case “comes
nowhere near that line.”197 The Sixth Circuit was also quick to point out
that Jones provided no support for the defendant’s position in Skinner 198
since there was no physical trespass involved. 199 As with Knotts and
Karo, Skinner can be distinguished from Jones based on the fact that the
cell phone obtained by the defendant included the GPS technology prior
190. 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004), judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Garner v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
191. Id. at 947.
192. Id. at 948.
193. Id. at 951.
194. While the pinging method utilizes the GPS capabilities of the cell phone, it
does not relay the type of 24/7 tracking information that was at issue in Jones. See Cha,
supra note 168.
195. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 779-81 (6th Cir. 2012).
196. Id. at 780 (citation omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 780 (“Jones does not apply to Skinner’s case because, as Justice
Sotomayor stated in her concurrence, ‘the majority opinion’s trespassory test’ provides
little guidance on ‘cases of electronic or other novel modes of surveillance that do not
depend upon a physical invasion on property.’” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
199. Id. at 780 (“[T]he majority in Jones based its decision on the fact that the
police had to ‘physically occup[y] private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.’” (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949)).
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to coming into the defendant’s possession. Thus, the defendant could not
object to the use of the phones inherent trackability, 200 just as the
defendants in Knotts and Karo had no standing to object to the
trackability of the beeper-laden containers, because the beepers were
placed in the containers prior to coming into the possession of the
defendants.201
Another issue inherent in the use of smartphones, cells phones, and
other wireless devices, which issue was raised as a concern by Justice
Alito in his concurrence in Jones, is the pervasive use of such
technology.202 As Justice Alito notes, as of June 2011, “more than 322
million wireless devices” were in use in the United States. 203 His concern
is that, as availability and use of these devices continues to grow, they
“will continue to shape the average person’s expectations about the
privacy of his or her daily movements.” 204 Justice Alito may find
persuasive support for this argument in Kyllo v. United States,205 which
involved the use of thermal imaging technology to detect heat emanating
from the home of the defendant. In an opinion ironically written by
Justice Scalia, the Court held that use of thermal imaging technology
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that
there was no physical intrusion into defendant’s home, because the
technology allowed the government to obtain information about the
inside of the home that was otherwise inaccessible without a physical
intrusion.206 Justice Scalia went on to say, however, that “[i]t would be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology[,]”207 and intimated that only when technology is not in
general public use, such that privacy could be reasonably expected, will
use of such technology constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.208 The inference being that when technology is more

200. Id. at 777.
201. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276 (1983).
202. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“Recent years
have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit the monitoring of a person’s
movements.”).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
206. Id. at 40.
207. Id. at 33-34.
208. Id. at 40 (“Where, as here, the [g]overnment uses a device that is not in general
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pervasively used the scope of reasonable expectations of privacy
diminishes. However, notwithstanding Justice Alito’s persuasive
argument in Jones, he seems quite willing to allow acceptable societal
norms or legislative actions to decide the issue of persuasive use. 209
Yet another issue that plagues the use of smartphones and other
wireless devices is the “third-party doctrine” and the government’s
ability to access a tremendous amount of personal information, including
by means of tracking, directly from third-party service providers, through
the subpoena process or otherwise. 210
C.

Third-Party Service Providers and the “Third-Party Doctrine”

Privacy concerns over social networking sites, such as Facebook
and Twitter, where people share the utmost intimate details, photos, and
information about their personal lives, and service providers, like
Amazon, Google, and iTunes, that collect vast amounts of information
about our choices, have become a major topic of concern among the
legal community.211 When considering the vast amount of information
stored with some of these sites and service providers, the issue becomes
immediately apparent. When a user shares his or her personal
information with social networking sites or decides to shop with thirdparty service providers, his or her data is stored and hosted on the thirdparty’s hardware.212 In most instances, there is nothing to prevent
government investigators from trying to subpoena the information
without an individual’s knowledge or consent. 213 Under the longpublic use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”).
209. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (“New technology
may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many
people may find the tradeoff worthwhile. . . . On the other hand, concern about new
intrusions on privacy may spur the enactment of legislation to protect against these
intrusions.”).
210. See discussion infra Part III.C.
211. See, Adam Cohen, Should the FBI Be Allowed to Wiretap Facebook, TIME
(May 29, 2012), http://www.ideas.time.com/2012/05/29/should-the-fbi-be-allowed-towiretap-facebook/.
212. See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy – Full Version, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=%20322194465300 (last updated Oct. 29,
2009). Sections Two and Three of Facebook’s Privacy Policy make clear that the
information one provides to Facebook may not only be stored but shared under various
circumstances.
213. Id. Section Five of Facebook’s Privacy Policy states in pertinent part: “We
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standing “third-party doctrine,”214 these instances of government
intrusion into an individual’s personal life will fall outside of the purview
of Jones and Katz.
Under Jones, since the shared information is stored and hosted on
someone else’s hardware, there can be no physical intrusion. Even if the
government is successful in obtaining the information for an
“investigatory purpose,” since there is no trespass, there would be no
Fourth Amendment violation under Jones.215
Likewise, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists under Katz
precisely because the information was shared with a third-party and thus
became the property of the third-party. The “third-party doctrine” line of
cases directly supports this view. In United States v. Miller,216 the
defendant was charged with various federal offenses, and moved to
suppress certain financial records relating to certain accounts maintained
with two banks pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. 217 The
financial information included microfilms of checks, deposit slips, and
other financial records. 218 The Court held that that there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial records maintained by
the bank since the defendant voluntarily conveyed the information to a
third-party.219 Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland,220 the Court held that the
use and installation of a “pen register” to record numbers which the
defendant dialed did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment because the numbers dialed were made public to the phone
company.221
Justice Sotomayor for one thought the “third-party doctrine”
deserved another look as being “ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
may disclose information pursuant to subpoenas, court orders, or other requests
(including criminal and civil matters) if we have a good faith belief that the response is
required by law.”
214. The “third-party doctrine” provides that by disclosing information to a thirdparty, such person gives up all of his or her Fourth Amendment rights pertaining to the
information disclosed. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107
MICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2009).
215. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5 (“[T]he obtaining of information is not alone a
search unless it is achieved by . . . a trespass or invasion of property.”).
216. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
217. See id. at 437-39.
218. Id. at 438.
219. Id. at 440.
220. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
221. See id. at 742-46.
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parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”222 She writes,
“[p]eople disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their
cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with
which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books,
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.”223 Justice
Sotomayor concludes by saying, “I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth
Amendment protection[,]”224 but, nevertheless, she was content to
resolve the issue in Jones on the narrower basis of trespass.225
IV. Conclusion
While Jones failed to answer all the questions that technology
creates, it did serve to highlight a previously glossed-over privacy
issue—whether there is a privacy interest in the sum total of one’s
movements. 226 Though Jones dealt exclusively with GPS technology,
which is capable of generating “a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about . . .
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”227
other technologies, including smartphones, manufacturer GPS-equipped
vehicles, license-plate scanners, and roadside video cameras, to name a
few, all may be used in a similar manner to track and record isolated
instances of an individual’s movements. These can then be stored and
later aggregated to create a unique profile of an individual’s movements,
and which can reveal personal information in a way not previously
considered. This mosaic effect deeply concerned at least one Justice as it
relates to GPS technology, and presumably any technology with the
attributes of GPS monitoring.228 Justice Sotomayor wrote that
222. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 956. Justice Sotomayor seemed convinced that there should be when
she states: “I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the [g]overnment to ascertain, more
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” Id.
(emphasis added); see also infra text accompanying note 227.
227. Id. at 955.
228. Id. at 956 (“I would take the[] attributes of GPS monitoring into account when
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of

31

GATEWOOD Macro Final

714

7/26/2013 4:49 PM

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:2

“[a]wareness that the [g]overnment may be watching chills associational
and expressive freedoms. And the [g]overnment’s unrestrained power to
assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to
abuse.”229 She further added, “I would also consider the appropriateness
of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a
coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the
Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power to
and [sic] prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’” 230
Ultimately, with each new advancement in technology will come
even greater and more precise methods of recording, storing, and
aggregating information in a manner that may be later used to determine,
with particular detail, how we travel, what we buy, what we read, who
we visit, and so on. No physical intrusion of any kind will be necessary
to acces the information generated by many forms of these technologies,
and some may even become so common-placed we may just accept the
loss of privacy that comes with the convenience. 231 Yet still other
technology may be used to record only isolated pockets of information
comparable to visual observation so as to be unobjectionable. Whatever
the case, it is clear that the constitutional tests articulated in Jones and
Katz will fail in these instances. Consequently, as GPS and other
technology with similar attributes continue to be employed by law
enforcement without judicial oversight, the Court will be inundated with
ever vexing and complex issues regarding privacy rights. As such, the
Court must be willing to look beyond the facts of a particular case and
address the issues in light of their overall effect on Fourth Amendment
privacy rights.
At the end of the day, Jones missed a huge opportunity for the Court
to finally address critical issues on how the government uses technology
(and not just GPS technology) to amass large sums of isolated
information about an individual’s movements that can be later
aggregated, and over time, used to develop a profile on how an
individual lives his or her life. Because the Court chose to resolve these
crucial issues another day, the true significance of Jones may be in what
one’s public movements.”).
229. Id.
230. Id. (citation omitted).
231. Justice Alito alluded to the same conclusion when he stated: “Dramatic
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and
may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may
provide increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people
may find the tradeoff worthwhile.” Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
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it did not say rather than what it did say—a case of “sound and fury,
[s]ignifying nothing.”232

232. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 4.
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